Amanda Mott

February 9, 2007

On Monday, January 29, 2007, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) decided that it is "impractical for plant operators to try to stop terrorists from crashing an airliner into a reactor (a job for the military, usually), they should instead focus on limiting radioactive release from any such airborne attack." This revision of the earlier design basis threat (DBT) final rule applies to commercial nuclear power reactors and Category I Fuel Cycle Facilities. It attempts to tackle security issues at nuclear power plants and enhance security regulations governing the (DBT). The final rule describes situations which licensee's physical protection system must be able to defend against; illustrates various modes of attack, competence of attackers and the intent of the attack; and considers the twelve factors listed in the Energy Policy Act of 2005. It will be codified at 10 C.F.R. § 73.1. This is just the first of many changes the NRC plans to impose on Nuclear Power Plant security.

The "enhanced" DBT rule outlines the amount of protection that must be implemented on reactions to protect against terrorist attacks. The rule includes the threat of a cyber-attack as part of the DBT, but does not include attacks using commercial aircraft. It rejected the "beamhenge (steel I-beams and cabling)" concept proposed in 2004. A statement from chairman Dale Klein on the Commission's affirmation of the final DBT rule stresses:

"Nuclear power plants are inherently robust structures that our studies show provide adequate protection in a hypothetical attack by an airplane…the NRC Commission continues to study and discuss the issue of airborne threats against our licenses and will take regulatory action in the future should it be determined that is necessary … ."

The NRC further explained that such an attack is not something for nuclear plant operators to manage, but would be better dealt with in minimizing the amount of radiation released in the case of an airliner attack. Instead of preventing such a catastrophe, they want to clean up "after the fact"

In subsequent rules the NRC plans to modify the framework for new reactors to incorporate NRC security requirements, revise and update physical protection requirements for operating reactors, and provide requirements for security design assessments for new reactors.

Excluding enhanced safety regarding air attacks on nuclear reactors is risky. While the chance of such an attack occurring and being successful is very small, such a scenario is not impossible or improbable. Adding additional safeguards would better protect the public from the catastrophic results of such an attack.

Sources:

Feds: Defending Nuclear Plants from Airliner Attack Impractical, The Journal News, Jan. 29, 2007, available at http://www.thejournalnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20070129/UPDATE/701290393/1284 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Frequently Asked Questions About NRC's Design Basis Threat Final Rule (Jan. 2007), available at­­­­ http://www.nrc.gov/security/faq-dbtfr.html (last visited February 8, 2007).

Winston & Strawn LLP, Commission Affirms Design Basis Threat Rule (Jan. 2007), available at http://www.winston.com/siteFiles/publications/CommissionAffirmsDesignBasisThreat_NRC.pdf. (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).

Public Citizen, NRC Votes Against Requiring Reactors to Be Protected from Air Attacks or A Large Number of Attackers (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2369 (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, NRC Approves Final Rule Amending Security Requirements, No. 07-012 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2007/07-012.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Statement from Chairman Dale Klein on Commission's Affirmation of the Final DBT Rule, No. 07-013 (Jan. 29, 2007), available at http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/doc-collections/news/2007/07-013.html (last visited Feb. 8, 2007).